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Labels, cognomes, and cyclic
computation: an ethological
perspective
Elliot Murphy*
Division of Psychology and Language Sciences, University College London, London, UK
For the past two decades, it has widely been assumed by linguists that there is a single
computational operation, Merge, which is unique to language, distinguishing it from other
cognitive domains. The intention of this paper is to progress the discussion of language
evolution in two ways: (i) survey what the ethological record reveals about the uniqueness
of the human computational system, and (ii) explore how syntactic theories account for
what ethology may determine to be human-specific. It is shown that the operation Label,
not Merge, constitutes the evolutionary novelty which distinguishes human language from
non-human computational systems; a proposal lending weight to a Weak Continuity
Hypothesis and leading to the formation of what is termed Computational Ethology. Some
directions for future ethological research are suggested.
Keywords: minimalism, labeling effects, cognome, animal cognition, formal language theory, language evolution
The assumption of many contemporary linguists is that part of the complexity of the world’s
languages is encoded in the human computational system. In one of the most prominent branches
of linguistics, the Minimalist Program (Chomsky, 1995), the operation which language’s human-
unique aspects may reduce to is termed “Merge.” This constructs a new syntactic object out of
two already formed. Merge(the, man) would form {the, man}. Assimilating standard accounts
(Chomsky, 2013; Boeckx, 2014), we can define the operation as follows:
(1) Merge
Select two lexical items a and b and form the set {a,b}:
M(a,b)= {a,b}
Merge is a computational operation in the traditional sense that it is being described at a higher
level of abstraction than algorithmic procedures and the implementational level of neurons and
dendrites (Marr, 1982). Early minimalism held that when Merge targets two syntactic objects,
a and b, forming a new object,  , the label of   is either a or b. That is, when two lexical
items (LIs) are merged, one of them “wins” and is projected as the head: M(a,b) = {a{a,b}} or
{b{a,b}}. With red car, the label is car since this word determines the category of the phrase (a
noun phrase, not an adjectival phrase). Narita (2011, p. 191) summarizes this “old intuition” by
writing that “it is simply an ordinary fact about language that “noun phrases” are interpreted in
a “nouny” way.” The label indicates the structure’s meaning to the conceptual-intentional (CI)
system (an axiom assumed in Chomsky, 2013; Epstein et al., 2014; and much other work). To
put it plainly, labeling is the operation which chooses which lexical features select the phrasal
category. The central arguments of this paper will be that, firstly, this form of asymmetric
hierarchy is created by labeling, and secondly, that this process is unique to humans. To briefly
illustrate the latter point, even though it has been well established that birds can “chunk”
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song units, these do not appear to contain the properties out
of which the chunks are composed. The warble-rattle chunks of
chaffinches (Riebel and Slater, 2003), for instance, do not host
the properties of either of the individual song units. There are
no “warble phrases” or “rattle phrases,” just warbles and rattles
externalized in a particular sequence.
A recent study of relational nominals (Adger, 2013) holds
that labeling is exocentric, separating it from the merging and
moving seen in standard minimalist accounts. Adger (2013)
is troubled by the relegation of labeling to a mere side effect
of Merge in Bare Phrase Structure, a strand of minimalist
syntax in which LIs are Merged to check features before being
transferred to the CI and sensorimotor (SM) systems. Finally,
Chomsky claims that the label of a structure is selected through
an epiphenomenal process of computational efficiency, a reflex
of natural law (Chomsky, 2013, pp. 43–46, Boeckx, 2009, pp.
52–54, see Brody, 1998 for an alternative account). Label-free
systems relying purely on set-formation and feature-checking of
the kind developed by Collins (2002) and Narita (2012) are in
some respects theoretically elegant, but they deal poorly with
movement, since they “effectively predict that a DP in the specifier
of another DP will always be more prominent for syntactic
relations outside the latter DP” (Adger, 2013, p. 16). Labels are
useful for showing how dominance relations are “exploited” by
the grammar (Hornstein, 2009, p. 46), and they can also derive
certain -Criterion effects (Narita, 2009). Tomalin (2007, p. 1784)
observes in his account of the development of the theory of
recursive functions that “even if a label-free system is proposed,
the essential constructional process remains the same”; that is,
set-formation and labeling are essential for the construction
of “a potentially infinite set of hierarchical structures.” Label-
free systems also ignore the extra-linguistic simplicity of more
atomic accounts which differentiate between the distinct cognitive
operations of what Poeppel (2012) has named in general the
“human cognome” (the finite set of operations available to the
human brain) and Balari and Lorenzo (2013) in relation to the
language faculty the “Central Computational Complex” (CCC;
the finite set of operations available to the nervous system). These
syntactic perspectives will be discussed below, serving as the basis
from which to assess broader questions in the life sciences.
The concerns of linguists also bear directly on Tinbergen’s
(1963) seminal ethological research program, which aimed to
explore development (ontogenesis), how a behavior develops
in an organism, and evolutionary history (phylogenesis), how
it developed in the species. By following his “aims and
methods,” what ethology has revealed about the cognition of
non-human animals has been highly instructive. Yet as I intend
to show, neither the general proposals of ethology, nor its
specific suggestions concerning the necessity of interdisciplinary
collaboration have been taken seriously by substantial elements
of the language sciences. Instead, the observation that language
has no biological equivalent from which direct comparative study
could proceed has been used to discourage comparative biological
and computational inquiry. The goal of this contribution is to
suggest new methods that these and related fields can use to
investigate the nature of language and the brains of both humans
and non-humans.
One of the central claims of what follows is that the
ethological implications of decomposing Merge into set-
formation (Concatenate) and Label (see “Simplest Merge and
Labeling”) have not been appreciated by researchers of non-
human cognition (and, as later sections detail, researchers of
human cognition as well). The ethological background will
be outlined in more concrete terms in Section “Approaching
Computational Ethology: The Evidence,” concrete terms shortly,
and oncewe view thematter from the perspective ofwhat Iwill call
“Computational Ethology,” which investigates comparatively the
cognomes of non-humans, surprising theoretical consequences
arise. The section “Simplest Merge and Labeling” discusses
syntactic primitives within a minimalist framework. The section
“Approaching Computational Ethology: The Evidence” presents
the bulk of ethological evidence we will discuss. Those aspects of
the cognome deemed human-unique in Section “Approaching
Computational Ethology: The Evidence” deemed human-
unique are discussed in Section “Homo Combinans or Homo
Projectans?” Finally, the last section suggests some new directions
for testing the central hypotheses put forward.While Hauser et al.
(2002, 2014) used primate calls to draw attention to the supposed
human-uniqueness of Merge, I will instead focus primarily on
birdsong as evidence for the human-uniqueness of Label. Part of
this paper will be dedicated to an ethological survey, but in order
to know what it is we are searching for a theoretical syntactic
backdrop is required. The following pages will consequently
be divided into between ethological and syntactic explorations,
supplemented by evolutionary, cognitive and other perspectives
where appropriate.
Simplest Merge and Labeling
This section presents an introductory discussion of the concepts
relevant to our ethological discussion (and some which explicitly
will not be), a necessary step in placing syntactic inquiry within
the life sciences.
Concatenation
Merge is plainly a core operation of the computational system
of human language, but its scope remains unclear. A dominant
view in generative grammar is that word movement is a
primitive operation, a case of “just simple Merge” for (Chomsky,
2012a, p. 3; Chomsky, 2013, p. 40). There is sound evidence,
however, that Merge is actually a form of Concatenation
plus Label (Hornstein, 2009). Hornstein (2009, p 113),
for instance, note that the operation combine(a,b) is not
primitive, and consists of LABEL[CONCATENATE(A,B)]. These
investigations are central to what I have elsewhere called the
Decompositionalist Project (Murphy, 2015c), which explores
the fine structure of the cognome through embracing the full
range of interdisciplinary investigations in the cognitive and
biological sciences. Concatenation takes two objects and forms
from them an unordered set, {a b}. This is a case of what
Epstein et al. (2014, p. 471) term “Simplest Merge,” noting that
“composite operations are in general unwelcome as we search
for the primitive, minimal, undecomposable operations of NS
[narrow syntax].” Labeling then imposes order after searching
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for a head, say b. Further, the “copy” of b, <b>, would be left
after b has been concatenated in a new position: {b a b}! {b b {b
a<b>}}. In the simplest cases, this would represent certain types
of question formation, where a copy of the wh-phrase is left in its
initially concatenated position, for reasons of interpretability at
the CI interface: “What did you buy <what> ?” The implications
of assuming unordered set-formation to involve Concatenate, and
not Merge, will become clear in the next section. In addition, for
ease of ethological exposition below I will put aside the standard
context-free definition of Concatenation involving conjoined,
ordered sets.
Agree
Consider the sentences in (2):
(2) a. There seems to be likely to be a man in the garden.
b. There seem to be likely to bemen in the garden.
As noted in the minimalist literature, in such there-expletive
constructions the main verb exhibits long-distance number
agreement with an associate noun phrase. This featural
covariation cannot be delivered by pure set-formation, and
so an independent operation, Agree, has often been appealed
to (Chomsky, 2000a), in which a probe with an unvalued
feature searches its domain for an eligible goal with a valued
feature to match (Narita, 2014, p. 31). The value of the goal is
then copied onto the probe, establishing syntactic covariance
between features of two different objects. But for the purposes of
comprehensiveness it is worth noting that, unlike Concatenate
and Label, Agree is not required at all for reasons of economy and
there exist at least “three different ways of modeling long distance
agreement phenomena” without it (Hornstein, 2009, p. 117). I will
assume with Kobele (2006, p. 143) that Agree is just movement
“with particular interface effects” (contra Narita, 2009), with the
lower copy being pronounced, although standard formulations of
Agree crucially impose no demands on the interfaces, being what
Adger and Svenonius (2011) dub a “syntax-internal” operation
(see also Arregi and Nevins, 2013).
Natural Numbers
If Chomsky (2012b) and Hinzen (2009) are right that Merge
yielded the natural numbers via the successor function, then it
must be free of “triggers” such as the valuation of features, as
often assumed, since the natural numbers clearly do not rely on 0-
features. They also do not appear to require labeling, as Tomalin
(2007, p. 1795) writes: “[T]he objects generated by the repeated
application of Merge are not associated with labels : : : and
therefore the computational processes of arithmetic do not seem
to require the same information concerning hierarchical structure
that is required by the computational procedures that generate
syntactic objects.” This freeing of Concatenate from lexical
influence will have implications for our ethological account.
Adjuncts
Concatenation has gone by many names: “Adjoin” (Adger,
2003), “Adjunction” (Hinzen, 2011), “Concatenate” (Pietroski,
2002). Abstracting away from the particular concerns of these
papers, each definition assumes that the operation purely involves
unordered set-formation. If Concatenate is not unique to humans,
the sentential structures formed by may effectively be residues
of ape cognition, as suggested by Boeckx (2008). Chomsky
(2001b) gives adjunction a “principled explanation” by saying
that the CI systems need an operation of predicate composition,
but this amounts to a functional requirement which serves
only to rationalize the existence of a computational operation.
Not only does this functionalist perspective fly in the face of
naturalism (Chomsky’s, 2000b), this kind of argument should not
be welcomed given our lack of knowledge as to what the CI system
actually consists of (see Hinzen, 2009). On this occasion, the
ethological viewpoint Boeckx promotes sheds more light on the
puzzle of adjunction than other minimalist accounts. The features
of adjuncts suggest that they amount to the least central structures
syntax can produce, hence why Chomsky (2001b) points out
that when a adjoins (concatenates) to b, b behaves as if a was
“not there, apart from semantic interpretation.” Adjuncts do not
participate in control or feature-checking and are not selected,
and if Hinzen (2009) is right that semantic objects are creatures
of syntax, then since Concatenate is a simpler computational
operation than Merge, we would expect its semantics to be less
rich. This prediction seems to hold true: Neo-Davidsonians like
Pietroski (2002, 2005) assume that right-Merged adverbials have a
very simple, but still compositional conjunctive semantics. Their
interpretation consists of conjoining predicates. Intuitively, walk
quicklymeans there is a walking that is quick:
(3) walk quickly: (9e) e is a walking and e is quick
Arguments lack this semantics: Jason ran does not mean there
is a running and it is Jason, but rather: 9e [ran (e) and THEME
(Jason, e)]. Labeling can be appealed to in order to deliver this
outcome (Gallego, 2010, p. 16, Hornstein and Pietroski, 2009, p.
117, Pietroski, 2008), since it produces a result which cannot be
reduced to the meaning of its parts. Labeling mismatches “invoke
thematic concepts,” for Hornstein (2009, p. 125). Adjunction is
thus blind to “participant-of ” relations, and we would expect any
species only capable of concatenation to be unable to compute
“thoughts” like Jason ran. This has led some to speculate that
simian cognition can process modificational structures like “(the)
[red [heavy [box]]].” Hence non-hierarchical adjuncts come
“for free” from our simian ancestors through this set-formation
operation, while argument structure requires a labeling algorithm
to yield v*Ps.
Labeling
Hornstein (2009), Boeckx (2010), Adger (2013), and various
others have suggested that the headedness/endocentricity
generated by labeling (though which one element determines the
identity of the larger phrase) is a property unique to language
distinguishing it from other modes of hierarchical cognition
(e.g., kinship relations). Many labeling theories, of the kind seen
in Boeckx (2008), propose that it is lexical properties which
determine an LI’s capacity for specifiers and complements.
Chomsky (2013, 2015b) likewise proposes that head detection
can be reduced purely to minimal search of an LI, while
labeling must take place at the point of transfer to the interfaces
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(Chomsky, 2015b), obeying principles of least effort and other
“third factor” constraints (Chomsky, 2005 et seq.; Narita, 2012,
p. 156) terms this “minimal head detection.” The notion of
prominence here refers to those aspects of an LI which allow the
labeling algorithm to identify it as an atom to be headed (Narita,
2011, 2012, pp. 190).
(4) Minimal head detection
For any syntactic object , the head of  is the most
prominent LI within .
But these approaches are too lexico-centric, smuggling in a
further computation (call it “Inspect”) when labeling an {XP,
YP} structure, inspecting both heads of these constituents to
determine which should be labeled. More worryingly, Chomsky’s
(2013, 2015b) labeling algorithm, which relies on the notion that
word movement yields an asymmetry permitting labeling, simply
restates the pre-minimalist argument that a phrasal head projects
but does not explain why it projects.
The Cognome
Here we must introduce further operations if our ethological
discussion is to have any context. The operation Transfer sends the
syntactic object taken from the lexicon by Select and constructed
by Concatenate and Label to the interfaces. Since recent studies
suggest that the timing of Transfer to the two interfaces differs
(Marušič, 2009), this has been divided into two operations: Spell-
Out at SM (Uriagereka, 2012) and Interpret at CI (Lasnik and
Uriagereka, 2005, p. 240). The former process is commonly
termed externalization, prompting Berwick et al. (2013, p. 91)
to call interpretation at CI “internalization.” Feature-checking
and copying, Hornstein (2009, p. 3) notes, are “almost certainly
operative in other cognitive domains, albeit with different
expressions being copied and different features being checked.”
Given this, the human cognome, which we can notate as /HUMAN
(/H), amounts to the following operations:
(5) /HUMAN = !(SELECT), k(CONCATENATE), $(COPY),
!(CHECK), x(LABEL),  (INTERPRET), (SPELL-OUT)
The remainder of this paper will review the ethological
literature before suggesting how this computational model could
be applied to some of the most thoroughly researched animals.
Approaching Computational Ethology: The
Evidence
Formal Language Theory
Beginning with the most well studied organisms, it has been
shown that the birdsong notes of Zebra finches often combine into
multi-element syllables, which combine intomotifs, which in turn
string together into song bouts (Cynx, 1990); a process depicted in
Figure 1.
These song bouts exhibit hierarchical structure, but there is no
labeling, nomapping of complexes into lexical equivalence classes
as is seen in human language.We can interpret these findings from
the perspective of the traditional hierarchy of formal languages
(see Jäger and Rogers, 2012 for an introduction):
(6) Chomsky Hierarchy (Chomsky, 1956b, 1957, 1963):
Type 0: Unrestricted systems (Turing machine)
Type 1: Context-sensitive systems (linear-bounded
automaton; sets of sets of symbol sequences)
Type 2: Context-free systems (push-down automaton; sets
of symbol sequences)
Type 3: Regular systems (finite-state automaton; symbol
sequences)
I should note from the outset that particular limitations
of this hierarchy will be discussed below, but due in Section
“Computational Ethology,” but due to the vast majority of
ethological work informed by linguistics being center on formal
language theory, it is necessary to initially discuss this work within
the standard framework. Formal language theory can indeed be
a useful tool in exploring the computational resources of and
patterns from different cognitive domains. For instance, Type 2
context-free phrase structure grammars were proven insufficient
for human language in the 1980s (Huybrechts, 1984; Shieber,
1985). Human language is thought to lie “beyond” Type 2 as
mildly context-sensitive (MCS) but “below” Type 1 languages
(Joshi, 1985), which cannot be parsed in polynomial time. MCS
languages are distinguished from Type 3 languages by their
narrow number of overlapping dependencies and their ability
to nest clauses inside clauses of indiscriminate depth. Phrase
structure grammars assume a counting mechanism, implemented
by push-down stackmemory, and so can generate AnBn structures
of the kind AiBi i  4, a finite subset of this language in which
n is no greater than 4. Finite-state grammars cannot achieve this
(Chomsky, 1956a), although they can generate (AB)n languages.
AnBn languages are thus not necessarily Type 3, but can make
use of Type 2 computations. Type 1 and 2 grammars require
a working memory space, dealing with dependencies between
constituents. Song sequences are usually non-random but are also
non-deterministic, with the probability of a song type depending
on one or more preceding type (Catchpole and Slater, 2008, pp.
208–209). If dependents are further back than the immediately
preceding type, then a higher order Markov chain is required, not
a context-free grammar. A representation of the power of formal
languages is found in Figure 2.
European starlings (Sturnus vulgaris) can distinguish AnBn
auditory sequences from those with an (AB)n structure according
to an influential study by Gentner et al. (2006), while nightingales
can sing motifs with notes embedded within looped chunks
(Todt and Hultsch, 1998). An (AB)n structure is a case of a
regular/finite-state grammar and is in the Strictly Local class SLk,
being constructed from a finite alphabet with a beginning () and
end (). (AB)n is an SL2 stringset definable by a set of 2-factors
(Rogers andHauser, 2010, pp. 9–10): D(AB)n= {A,AB,BA,B}.
Set-formation and the atomisation of call units is displayed,
then, but a labeling operation is absent. Call unit a can be
concatenated with unit b, forming the linear sequence <a, b> ,
but this structure is never given an independent computational
identity. Abe andWatanabe (2011, p. 1070) claim that finches can
distinguish syllable strings constructed by context-free grammars,
appearing to be sensitive to centre-embedded structures. Note
that embedding and recursion are not the same (Fitch, 2010b;
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FIGURE 1 | Sound spectrum of Zebra finch song with hierarchical structure (from Berwick et al., 2011, p. 114).
FIGURE 2 | The Chomsky Hierarchy and corresponding natural language patterns (from Heinz, forthcoming).
Watumull et al., 2014a,b), although memory constraints permit
and encourage recursion.
It should also be noted, however, that mastering AnBn
structures involves comparing two sequences of elements,
a task achievable by sound short term memory and not
necessarily Type 2 cognomes (see Ojima and Okanoya, 2014,
pp. 166–170 for critical commentary). MCS languages also go
beyond this by generating AnBmCnDm stringsets with cross-serial
dependencies; no human language is known to require further
power. Consequently, any ethological model which attempts
to show the context-freeness of non-human syntax needs to
demonstrate that the As and Bs are paired together. Merely
showing that the number of distinct elements are equal, as in
the Gentner et al. (2006) model, does not entail a dependency.
Fitch and Friederici (2012, p. 1943) document that counting and
comparing across phrases, the computation required to recognize
AnBn, is “difficult or impossible for most tested non-human
species.” They also suggest that the concept of bilateral/mirror
symmetry requires a context-free grammar capable of recognizing
AnBn structures and, as a result, able to engage in mirror
symmetry detection (Fitch and Friederici, 2012, pp. 1943–1944).
AnBn languages, though context-free, can still be recognized by
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a finite-state automata augmented with a simple counter (Jäger
and Rogers, 2012, p. 1962, Zimmerer et al., 2014), bringing into
question what computational capacities ethologists are in fact
investigating. As Zuidema (2013a) observes, Gentner et al. (2006)
also presented stimuli to teach starlings to distinguish AnBn from
(AB)n, but no stimuli was presented which would allow them to
exclude AnBm, leading to ambiguities over whether the starlings
could actually learn Type 2 languages.
A further problem with many experiments (e.g., Abe and
Watanabe, 2011; Ten Cate and Okanoya, 2012) is their lack
of specificity about the object of investigation (and, in the
case of Abe and Watanabe, 2011, their additional mistakes in
experimental materials renders their findings extremely suspect
(see Berwick et al., 2012)), demonstrating a general failure to
distinguish between the ability to implement, learn, and have
a preference for a Type 2 language. To this day, the MCS
of non-humans has not been tested, with ethologists typically
favoring the search for identification of nesting. Even the most
recent research (Kershenbaum et al., 2014) suggests only that
non-Markovian dynamics like the “renewal process” (a strong
tendency to repeat elements) may characterize the vocalizations
of seven taxa including Bengalese finches, rock hyraxes and killer
whales, rather than Markovian processes or, indeed, context-free
grammars. Further research is needed to determine whether birds
can recognize Type 2 languages and which family of Type 2 or
3 languages matches their auditory cognition; for instance, can
finches recognize a more complex finite-state pattern such as
A1(BA1)1, where 1 indicates paired elements?
For now it at least seems clear that, lacking a lexicon or
identifiable semantics (Catchpole and Slater, 2008), birdsong
is best characterized as “phonological syntax” (Marler, 1998),
resembling most strongly human sound structure. Although
human phonological structure is characterisable via finite-state
machines, there the similarities appear to end with birdsong
syntax. Gentner and Hulse (1998), for instance, proved that
a first-order Markov model serves to describe the majority of
starling motif sequences, with every motif being predictable by its
immediate predecessor.
From an evolutionary-developmental (evo-devo) perspective,
Balari and Lorenzo (2013) reinterpret the Chomsky Hierarchy
as a family of Owenian archetypes (CompuT1, etc.). While
we may not have a comprehensive understanding of the
morphological properties of these phenotypes, since the early
days of generative grammar it has been possible to develop
comprehensive computational characterisations of them. Moving
from one computype to a less complex one is not prevented,
something which may be analogous to “the putative episodes in
brain reduction proposed for some metazoan lineages” (Balari
and Lorenzo, 2013, p. 125). Type 2 grammars are scarce in nature
(Hurford, 2011), so a shift from Type 3 to MCS giving rise to
human grammar is more likely to have occurred than a Type 2-
MCS shift—an observation quite apart from the fact that both
these languages can be generated by an MCS grammar.
Hierarchy
As mentioned, the songs of Bengalese finches are markedly
predictable in that each sequence is constructed purely from
concatenating a new sub-sequence to the end of another. This
constitutes a form of trivial tail recursion (Fitch, 2010a). Bird
song, whale song and gibbon song are thus supposedly cases of
“phonological syntax,” but not “lexical syntax.” Bengalese finches
are also capable of “segmentation and chunking,” basic processes
thought to be involved in human language acquisition (Takahasi
et al., 2010, p. 481). As with phonological syntax, labeling is
not necessary for hierarchy. There is no endocentric labeling
in syllables which have a nested [[onset] [ [nucleus] [coda]]]
structure; further, there is no repeated nesting (syllables within
syllables). It has relatedly been claimed that wildmountain gorillas
appear to prepare nettles for eating in a hierarchical procedure
(Hurford, 2011), free of endocentricity:
(7) Nettle preparation (adapted from Byrne and Russon, 1998):
Find patch!Collect leaf-blades; Enough?	! [Strip stem;
Enough? 	 ! Tear-off petioles] ! Clean ! Fold blades.
[Eat nettles]
Byrne and Russon (1998, p. 667) conclude that “great apes
suffer from a stricter capacity limit than humans in the
hierarchical depth of planning.” Indeed, as Fitch and Friederici
(2012, p. 1936) comment, “as our understanding of neural
computation in vertebrates progresses, it seems likely that
different hierarchies will arise.” Pulvermüller (2014) even suggests
that locality conditions in syntax may impose constraints on the
“syntax of actions” and motor planning (see also Moro, 2014 for
objections, and Boeckx, 2014 for a review of the Pulvermüller-
Moro exchange). Be that as it may, what appears to be hierarchical
may simply be automated, with the brains of wild mountain
gorillas possibly having created a looped routine characterisable
in Markovian terms (see Penn et al., 2008, p. 117 for criticisms of
attributing hierarchical forms of cognition to non-humans).
Compositionality
Returning to issues of combinatorics, free-ranging male
Campbell’s monkeys have been shown to respond to disturbances
with around twenty loud calls and six call types: krak, krak-oo,
hok, hok-oo, wak-oo, and boom (Ouattara et al., 2009). The
majority of sequences include a series of krak-oo calls which
are occasionally concatenated with other types, while the
tempo is modulated by the sense of emergency. The contact
calls of female Campbell’s monkeys can be externalized as
single units (ST1, SH2 etc.), combined, e.g., Concatenate(ST1,
SH2)= {CT}, or distinguished by a suffix (e.g., Concatenate(SH2,
frequency-modulated-arch) = {CH6}. These sequences are used
to communicate narrow contextual information, the content of
which can be strongly modified by slight changes (Lemasson
et al., 2013).
The computational capacities required for such concatenation
do not seem to extend beyond Type 3 systems, and it appears that
themonkeys are restricted to a single application of concatenation.
Schlenker et al. (2014) have developed a formal semantic analysis
of the calls of free-ranging Campbell’s monkeys, proposing that
krak and hok are “roots” which independently convey information
(and can have attributed to them a propositional semantics, “type
t”) and which can be optionally affixed with -oo, whilst calls which
begin with boom boom indicate a non-predatory context. Krak
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appears to have different “lexical entries” (conceptual content) for
two different groups ofmonkeys in Tai forest (Ivory Coast) and on
Tiwai island (Sierra Leone), and so seems to be “underspecified”
in the way that many human language constructions require
pragmatic strengthening and saturation. These call combinations
can be generated by a finite state grammar (Schlenker et al., 2014,
p. 454), with a “leopard call,” for instance, having the following
structure (“*”=multiple occurrences, “K”= krak-oo, “k”= krak):
(8) Leopard call: k K*, k k*
The cognome of white-handed gibbons also permits the
concatenation of a finite set of units to yield duet and predator
songs (Clarke et al., 2006), utilizing combinatorial rules to
advertise pair bonds and repel conspecific intruders. Numerous
monkey species also produce call combinations which convey
complex meanings distinct from the atomic calls, but do this
in a highly constrained and non-cyclic fashion (Zuberbühler,
2012). Bottlenose dolphins also demonstrate “a capability for
reasoning about higher order relations through the spontaneous
combination or concatenation of previously generalized concepts”
(Herman et al., 2008, p. 139). To stress the central argument of
this paper, as with birdsong a labeling operation appears to be
absent from all of these computations.
We can conclude from this section that the evidence in favor
of non-human MCS grammars is either non-existent or based
on speculation and misrepresentation, while the evidence for
Type 2 grammars is dubious, although this may be due more
to the methodological flaws of a young field (Fitch and Hauser,
2004; being the first major study) than the computational
properties of its objects of inquiry. The next section will explore
the implications of this in relation to emerging developments in
minimalist syntax.
Homo Combinans or Homo Projectans?
The core suggestion ofmainstreamminimalism that the evolution
of grammar reduces to the appearance of Merge after a chance
mutation (Chomsky, 2010) leaves us with the risk that genericity
of computation may block insight into novelty of syntactic
structure (see Boeckx, 2015 for comments on the relationship
between minimalism and biolinguistics). In Berwick (2011)
view, along with the lexicon Merge is “all you need” for
language evolution [which may be “the hardest problem in
science” (Christiansen and Kirby, 2003)], recently updated in
his integration hypothesis (IH; Miyagawa et al., 2014), discussed
below. Minimalism has, I believe, identified “a new aspect of the
world” (Mukherji, 2010, p. 27), a new joint of nature, though it is
not to be found in concatenation, but labeling.
Symmetry Breaking and Cyclic Computation
This section explores the implications of assuming what I will call
the Labeling Hypothesis:
(9) Labeling Hypothesis:
The operation Label constitutes the evolutionary novelty
which distinguishes the human cognome from non-human
cognomes.
The novelty of adopting this hypothesis within an ethological
framework of assumptions becomes particularly vivid when
we note that even notable minimalists often sideline labeling,
with Berwick et al’s (2011, p. 119) review of avian and
human novel computational capacities merely noting on a single
occasion that “Birdsong motifs lack word-centric “heads” and so
cannot be individuated via some internal labeling mechanism to
participate in the construction of arbitrary-depth structures.” This
observation is accurate, but its implications for the evolution of
grammar are never discussed, nor are appropriate connections
drawn between the findings of ethologists and syntacticians.
Berwick et al., (2011, p. 120) further speculate that, “with the
addition of words, humans acquired the ability to label and “hold
in memory” in separate locations distinct phrases such as Allison
ate apples.” But this lexico-centrism gets the causation backward,
and ignores the possibly syntax-independent nature of labeling.
The arrival of Label (x) would have allowed the construction of
a lexicon, transferring the same atoms of computation (roots)
in different categorically specified structures, e.g., N
pwalk or
V
pwalk. The present model thus departs from Berwick et al.’s
account of human computational complexity and non-human
bounded call systems, since an anti-lexicalist focus on the
operation x permits a finer-grained hypothesis concerning the
cognitive (and, ultimately, neurobiological) capacities of humans.
This brings us to the conclusions drawn in Boeckx’s (2014,
p. xii) recent study, the central thesis of which is that “it
is the lexicon that depends on syntax and not the other
way around.” The asymmetries found in language such as the
external/internal argument distinction and the binder-bindee
relation rely on c-command, whose asymmetry emerges from
labeling. Boeckx (2014, p. 38) attempts to derive labeling effects
and all linguistic asymmetries from cyclic transfer, a worthwhile
project to undertake, as Marantz’s (2007) suggestion that roots are
categorized at the “phase” level (that is, at the point of transfer,
typically assumed to be DP, v*P and CP, but see Murphy, 2015b)
would suggest. But given the possibly language-independent (and
CI/SM-independent) nature of labeling, I suggest that a separate
computational procedure is required, not just a freeing of concepts
from their selectional restrictions as Boeckx argues for. This
permits us to explain certain lexical content in terms of labeling
choices; a red ball is an object (NP/DP), not a property (AP), and
John ran is an event (vP), not a special kind of thing (NP/DP).
x is required if only because there is nothing in the set-theoretic
definition of Merge which leads to symmetry-breaking. This is
a primary motivation behind Hornstein and Pietroski’s (2009, p.
133) claim that, semantically, “concatenation is an instruction to
conjoin monadic concepts, while labeling provides a vehicle for
invoking thematic concepts, as indicated by the relevant labels.”
Dyadic concepts like INTERNAL(E,X) can be introduced by
labels, with lexical items delivering the required information to
fill in the thematic content.
Labeling may also have yielded the vast categorization abilities
of humans, perhaps even of the type-token sort (Jackendoff,
2007, p. 106). Hornstein (2009, p. 58), for instance, has noted
that “labeling incorporates what Boeckx (2006) describes as rigid
categorization (dominance by type) and so it is not surprising
that when labeling emerges so too does this cognitive ability.”
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FIGURE 3 | Theories of the human cognome, specifically relating to
language.
Nevertheless, as mentioned, labeling is still predominantly seen
as a side effect of Merge. A recent monograph by Citko (2011)
bears the title Symmetry in Syntax: Merge,Move, and Labels—the
noticeable “s” pluralising “label” reflects this tendency to relegate
the labeling operation itself and focus on its products. The account
I am outlining here goes beyond Hornstein’s theory by placing
labeling at the centre of an ethologically unique model of organic
computational capacities (see Figure 3 for a summary of themajor
theories of Merge and labeling).
Lastly, by lending neurobiological validity to the separation of
lexicalisation, set-formation, labeling and cyclic transfer, recent
work by Ramirez et al. (2015) supports the view that labeling
alone is not sufficient for cyclicity. Instead, a labeling operation
leading to a transfer operation to both the CI and SM interfaces
(unlike in Campbell’s monkeys, which exhibit transfer purely
to the former, and birdsong to the latter) would be necessary
for the labeling effects found in human cognition. These cyclic
computations would perhaps be operationalised at different
points, as the decomposition of Spell-Outmentioned above would
imply.
Roots and Categories
Removing the long-standing Distinctness Condition on Merge,
Adger (2013) demonstrates that if a and b are distinct, or one
part of the other, or identical, these three logical possibilities
give rise to concatenation, movement and Self Merge. If a and
b are identical, Self Merge would yield {a,a} = {a}. As Boeckx
(2014, p. 47) summarizes, Self Merge “in effect turns one of the
atomic elements into a phrase, allowing the merger of two atomic
lexical items to comply with : : : the H-a schema.” Following the
lead of Distributed Morphology, if we assume that every LI has
a “root” (Marantz, 1997) then every sentence is constructed by
roots being Self Merged with themselves. This occurs because
bare roots cannot be “seen” by the labeling algorithm. The rootpbook would Self Merge to create pbook, which would then be
labeled by a universal sequence of functional categories, yielding
N
pbook. By showing that labeling yields thematic concepts while
concatenation yields simple monadic concepts, Hornstein and
Pietroski (2009, p. 126) explain that the verb stab results from
concatenating the root pstab with a verbal element which labels
the structure, [{V
p stab^V}]. Roots cannot be merged with other
syntactic objects, but require Self Merge, whilst labeling would be
impossible in pure Self Merge, since unary branching structures
cannot be interpreted by the external systems. This leads to what
we could call the Root-XP Constraint:
(10) Root-XP Constraint
*{pR XP}
I assume that functional categories are not LIs as they are inBare
Phrase Structure, which betrays its “bare” nature by adding further
endocentricity through claiming these categories are inherently
linked to LIs. Functional categories arise via Self Merge of roots,
and instead of the classical division between functional and lexical
LIs, Adger proposes a Root Lexicon and a Category Lexicon:
(11) RLex = {p1,: : :,pn}, the set of LIs (roots)
CLex = {11,: : :, 1n}, the set of category labels
RLex plus Concatenate (k) yields hierarchical structure, and
CLex provides the labels for these structures. This formulation
rightly departs from the Probing Algorithm of Ceccheto and
Donati (2010), which states that only the Probe (Chomsky, 2001b)
in aMerge operation can provide the label (seeMurphy, 2015c for
discussion). RLex is close to classical conceptions of the “lexicon”
or the Type L system of the IH (Miyagawa et al., 2014), while CLex
resembles the universal base (Cinque, 1999).
Syntax Without Ethology is Lame
In response to the question of what led to the Upper Paleolithic
Revolution (Bar-Yosef, 2002), Chomsky responds “Merge,”
Ramachandran (2011) responds “Mirror neurons,” Jackendoff
(2007) responds “Parallel Architecture,” but I think the evidence
increasingly suggests that the answer is “Label.” Many current
models ignore this operation and stick to investigations of
concatenation. To take a recent case, the IH sidelines labeling and
claims that language is simply the result of the convergence of two
finite-state systems, the misleadingly titled “L(exical) structure”
(observed in bee dances and primate calls) and “E(expression)
structure” (observed in birdsong), claimed to be brought about
by the arrival of Merge. Although the general picture of the
computational system interfacing with other systems is doubtless
correct, by sticking solely to this observation IH only succeeds
in formalizing a platitude, despite whatever positive impact
its persuasive rejection of Neo-Darwinian gradualism may
have on the field. Decomposing the interfaces into finite-state
systems has some value, but IH is oddly silent on the nature of
the computational system which integrated these pre-adapted
systems; Nóbrega and Miyagawa (2015) only comment that
Merge gave rise to “a single non-finite generative-engine capable
of yielding any sort of linguistic object,” with the cautiously
ambiguous nature of the term “non-finite” and their lack of
ethological range noticeable.
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Ethology Without Syntax is Blind
It was noted above that significant advances will be delayed so
long as linguists continue to sideline ethologists, but inquiry
will also suffer from linguists sidelining other linguists; namely,
those concerned with mathematical description and formalism.
Even Zuidema (2013b, p. 181), in his careful summary of
artificial grammar learning, notes only that human language is
“guided by a system of semantic and syntactic categories and
rules,” not going into any specifics which could be analyzed
alongside proposals in the animal cognition literature. Instead,
he proposes that the evolution of language reduces to the
emergence of “hierarchical compositionality” (Zuidema, 2013b,
p. 186), again failing to elaborate or produce a fine-grained
definition. Such a precise account at the computational level
is vital in order to differentiate between cognitive capacities
across the ethological spectrum, and failing to produce such
an account often leads to misunderstanding and premature,
even grand statements of theoretical coherence and success.
Consider, for instance, Zuberbühler’s (2015) review of the
“linguistic capacity of non-human animals,” which claims
that “the origin of language is the result of multiple gradual
transitions from earlier forms of primate-like communication
and social cognition.” Zuberbühler reaches this conclusion
through examining only the performance systems (e.g.,
vocal tract control) and extra-linguistic cognitive systems
(e.g., awareness of audiences during externalization) of non-
humans, sidelining completely the computational competence
system.
The science of language will therefore be stymied so long
as linguists continue to sideline ethologists, and ethologists
continue to embrace nebulous and inadequate conceptions
of syntax. Indeed, three prominent zoological researchers
(Lemasson et al., 2013, p. 183) describe it as the study of “how
independent meaningful units are combined into more complex
utterances,” failing to elaborate beyond this. Without a theory
of the objects language and grammar—the goal of theoretical
linguistics—it is impossible to assess the merits of attributing
such capacities to animals.
Narrow Labeling
If non-humans are ultimately shown by ethologists to have
context-sensitive grammars, this would imply that their grammars
are characterisable by a non-terminal alphabet, employing
“labels.” This would seem to disprove the human-unique theory of
labeling developed here. However, to equate non-terminals with
labels is not an a priori step (contra Narita, 2014, p. 18), for we
would have to premise this by claiming that the non-terminal
will be targeted by a subsequent operation and then interpreted,
otherwise the label would not be needed. Labels, Epstein et al.
(2014, p. 472) comment, are “arguably a natural requirement
necessary for CI interpretation.” Further to this, in natural
language labels employ narrowly linguistic functional categories
(Gallego, 2010), and so even if x were not human-unique, the
elements it operates on certainly are. Considering evidence that
animals such as pigeons can “chunk” information (Terrace, 2001),
forming a type of non-terminal atom of computation, we can
comment that labels and non-terminals should not necessarily be
equated, and that cyclic transfer to both interfaces is required for
labeling effects to arise.
I will return to this tension below, but for now another concern
can be raised: If I am endorsing exocentric labeling (i.e., the
sort of labels needed in Type 1 and 2 grammars), how can we
still speak of endocentricity? The answer lies in acknowledging
that (i) the cognitive features attributed to endocentricity (e.g.,
prominence), and the syntactic notions traditionally tied to it
(e.g., X-bar-theoretic heads), are by no means one and the same,
and (ii) exocentric labeling can give rise to such representations.
Endocentricity is not the only phenomenon requiring labels:
interface phenomena like prosodic domains (Samuels, 2011),
islands (Boeckx, 2003), and incorporation (Baker, 1988) also
require them.Under an exocentric system such as the one adopted
here, labeling is not “projection” at all, but rather what we could
call “injection,” assigning to roots a category label. Hornstein and
Pietroski (2009, p. 116) argue further that “the meaning of any
complex expression is the meaning of a labeled concatenation.”
If labeling effects are ultimately found outside language, perhaps
in the visual domain, then further investigation will be needed
to establish whether the application of x is free and lacking a
“purposeful” existence in the way that applications of Simplest
Merge are now thought to be (Epstein et al., 2014, p. 463).
The distinctive mark of language may not be its “infinite use
of finite means,” then, but rather the way it breaks the bounds
of semantic monotonicity by projecting new categories upon the
concatenation of two syntactic objects, giving us different kinds
of “things” to think about. We can continue to term the outputs
of x “projected” structures so long as we recognize the descriptive
status of the term, in a similar way that syntacticians still speak
of “phrase structure” despite the elimination of this component
many years ago. Language is also doubtless recursive, but what
Hinzen and Sheehan (2013, p. 101) call its “substantive content” is
found not in recursion (contra Chomsky, 2014), but rather in the
way x provides the means to introduce to atomic roots functional
structures which serve as the hosts of CI notions like predicate and
argument.
The Labeling Algorithm
What has been presented so far begs an important question, one of
the most central in modern linguistics. Adger (2013) names this
the Labeling Problem: Is there a unified labeling algorithm that
applies to all syntactic configurations? To answer this question
it is useful to refer to what Adger (2013, p. 21) calls a Universal
Extended Projection of a category C, a sequence of labels drawn
from CLex (1s,: : :,1t), 1s being the Start Label and 1t the Terminal
Label. Adger states the binary Cartesian product of CLex as a set
of label transition functions (LTFs), denoted by L. This yields an
algorithm which applies category labels to syntactic objects in a
constrained, sequential fashion:
(12) L= CLex CLex = { <N,C1> ,<N,N> , <C1,N> ,
<C1,C1> , <N,Num> ,: : :}
It follows that “for any particular (I-)language, some subset
of L will exist and will define, for that language, the particular
extended projections available : : : Part of the acquisition process is
determining what the content ofL is” (Adger, 2013, p. 21). x takes
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an unlabelled object as its argument and a category is assigned
to it via cyclic Transfer to the interfaces. The labeling algorithm
must furthermore apply at this derivational step, since structures
cannot differ at the two interfaces, being a v*P at CI but a CP at
SM (Chomsky, 2015b). Each I-language amounts to a subset of
possible LTFs. There are thus no functional heads, only functional
structures admitted by L. In addition, this reveals the stipulative
nature of the thematic domain in syntax, something which has
typically not been appreciated by minimalist philosophers (for
instance, Mukherji, 2010).
With this L-system, the trouble over specifiers, complements,
and the “problems of projection” (Chomsky, 2013) fade away. But
on these L-system grounds, as Svenonius (2012) would argue,
labeling is actually a finite state operation, since memory is not
needed to label the object under manipulation at any derivational
point if labels are not recognized but drawn from a set. It is
consequently possible to simply stipulate CLex/RLex relations
or overgenerate until a convergent result is reached. Instead of
stipulating a syntax-external CLex (where, after all, is such a
system embedded in the cognitive architecture, and where does it
come from?), categories rather emerge at the interfaces through
what I will call the Labeling Assembly (LA), produced through
the interaction of (i) general cognitive constraints, (ii) the CI-
system, (iii) the cognome (/H) and (iv) the lexicon. Hence labels
are not purely recognized at the semantic interface (as in Gallego,
2010 and the more dubious account in Krivochen, Forthcoming).
This does not, however, imply that labels are purely interface
phenomena, since the operation which constructs objects to be
assigned labels from the LA is independent of both concatenation
and transfer. Functional categories are composed of interpretable
properties such as force, finiteness andmodality; things which are
likely language-independent aspects of cognition. Note also that
the LA is not an independent system, but rather a convenient
way of denoting the interaction of the above four factors. In
addition, for reasons discussed below, I will replace Adger’s
reliance on fully-fledged roots via RLex with Boeckx’s (2014, p.
27) suggestion that the objects of narrow syntax are flat and
atomic, what he terms “lexical precursor cells” (LPCs).We can call
this modified, reduced lexicon the Precursor Lexicon, denoted by
pLEX. Additionally, if we consider Poeppel’s (2012) granularity
mismatch problem, Adger’s claim that the labeling algorithm
purely applies to roots is troubling; I would alternatively suggest
that it applies instead to LPCs, objects which are less language-
specific.
Since I have replaced CLex with the LA and RLex with pLEX,
the formal properties Adger discusses should consequently be
reconsidered from this perspective. Modifying Adger’s (2013, p.
22) theory for the systempursued here, wherea and b are syntactic
objects, the unified labeling function is as follows:
(13) a. Transition Labeling: If a,b 2 g, then Label(g) = some
LPC2pLEX, such that there are (possibly non-distinct)
f and g 2L such that f[Label(a)]= g[Label(b)]= LPC
b. Lexical Precursor Cell Labeling: Label ({px}) = some
LPC 2 {N,V,A}
Proceeding within this framework, the label of a syntactic
object is “dependent on (but not identical to) the label of both its
subconstituents” (ibid.). All derivations begin with the root, saypchair, being taken from pLEX by Select, Self Merging to create
{pchair}, then being labeled N({pchair}) byL, which in this case
would project “up” to D, given the followingL for English (where
C1 is the category born by a classified noun):
(14) L= { <N,C1> ,<C1,Num> , <Num,D> : : :}
This labeling algorithm would produce the following extended
projection: [D[Num[C1[N[pchair]]]]]. Assumptions of
simplicity lead me to qualify that the ordering of labels is
likely not part of universal grammar (UG), but rather emerges
from the complexity of different computational orderings.
Formalizing x
Since External Merge is a context-free operation, creating g
from any given a and b in a derivational space, it is available
for a Push-Down Automata and permits centre-embedding
(“true”) recursion. As mentioned, the Finite State Automata
required in the grammars of, for instance, Bengalese finches,
would be capable of only tail recursion. Yet if we endorse the
decomposition of Merge into k and x seen above, then in Section
“Simplest Merge and Labeling,” then x requires an algorithm to
analyze a and b to detect categorical features. Hence x must be
MCS—demanding an extended Push-Down Automata (PDA+)
to implement (Rychnovský, 2009)—if it is also requires to search
an object d and extract/copy a 2 d and concatenate it to d, a
case of reprojection (Surányi, 2008). The labeling effects seen in
word movement or “Internal Merge” (Chomsky, 2001a; Stabler,
2011), the concatenation of an object which is part of another,
require “a more developed procedural memory system” than pure
concatenation or “External Merge” (Bolender et al., 2008, p. 138,
contra Chomsky, 2013, p. 41). Thus while Merge in Chomsky’s
(2013) sense is non-Markovian, the operation of kwe extract from
it is. It follows that the only kind of behavioral evidence ethologists
could use to argue in favor of anMCS x operation in non-humans
would need to exhibit unbounded applications of concatenation,
with atoms (e.g., song or call units) forming constructed objects
which could then be used as atoms themselves, having been given
a syntactic status independent of their parts.
Svenonius (2012) additionally claims that features are
combined using two mechanisms. The first is “the finite state
network, which allows feature bundling in featurally complex
heads. The other is Merge, which allows embedding of one
category inside another.” But embedding via k is achieved only
in the event of x, and while feature bundling can be achieved
in a finite state network, the searching of lexical items and
deployment of external memory seen with x extends beyond
the feature bundling discussed by Svenonius. Further, instead of
adopting Svenonius’s Bundle operation, which combines features
into lexical items, I would argue that k is, to borrow Berwick’s
phrase, “all you need” to construct feature bundles. Only then is x
used to attribute to merged sets a syntactic status determined by
emergent properties of the embedding of /H within the external
systems, since bundling features is not computationally equivalent
to labeling, contra Boeckx (2014, p. 115). Functional hierarchies
must therefore be emergent at the LA; a case of third factor effects
upon /H arising via general cognitive mechanisms yet to be
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determined. TheL-system remains, then, but with this important
qualification regarding its syntax- and interface-external origin.
To briefly illustrate the workings of the proposed system: LPCs
are taken from pLEX, Self Merged, concatenated to form a set,
and labeled via the LA and L at the point of transfer to the
interfaces.
Architecture
Synthesizing what we have reviewed above, the basic architecture
of our system is as follows:
(15) a. /H
b. pLEX
c. Interfaces
When Pietroski (Forthcoming) speculates that the reason why
lamb, Venice, and other lexical items are so combinable is because
the acquisition of a lexicon allowed humans to efface many
typological distinctions, we can respond by pointing to the
labeling of flat and atomic roots from pLEX via the LA. Labeling
allows the brain to create items which can be freely deployed at
any time, partly independent of perception. When L, operating
through the LA, categorizes a root as either N or V, ultimately
yielding a swim or to swim, it achieves a level of cognitive flexibility
and innovative world-making in Chomsky’s (1972) sense which
nothing else in the natural world seems capable of emulating.
With the architectural framework clear, how can we now
evaluate the cognome? Transfer, Spell-Out, and Interpret,
though typologically distinct to humans, are most likely generic
information-transmitting operations, realized in other species.
The same applies to Check. The major operations of phonology,
Align and Wrap (Scheer, 2011, p. 390), though operating within
prosodic and syntactic phrase boundaries, may also reduce to
the kind of segmentation demonstrated by Bengalese finches
and other avian species. Collier et al. (2014) review the literature
on animal call sequences and conclude that phonology in
non-human vocal systems is rare, unlike basic combinatorics,
suggesting that the particular operations of human phonology
evolved after narrow syntax. As we have seen, k is an ancient
operations rooted in various forms of animal cognition. That
leaves x. I would argue from this that x is the human innovation
absent in other species. We now return to the ethological
consequences which immediately follow from this.
Computational Ethology
This final section will expand the syntactic considerations
found above by relating biolinguistic concerns to ethological
concerns. Suggestions to the ethological studies explored in
Section “Approaching Computational Ethology: The Evidence.”
Suggestions for testing the Labeling Hypothesis are also put
forward.
Weak Continuity
If syntax can “carve out” a wide variety of semantic phenomena
in human language, with k and x giving rise to semantic
compositionality, a (currently unanswered) question arises: Do
the computational systems of other species also perform such
a role? “[O]ur knowledge of the possible conceptual-intentional
processes underlying bird vocalizations is almost non-existent,”
caution four prominent researchers (Langus et al., 2013, p. 242).
At the same time, the CI systems of non-humans plainly operate
with cognomes which can carry out computations impossible for
humans. For birds and bees, “The local solar ephemeris is a spatio-
temporally contingent aspect of experience; it varies as a function
of both latitude and time of year, so it must be learned” (Gallistel,
2011, p. 254). These should be the guiding concerns of what I
will call Computational Ethology (which can be seen as a branch
of what Benítez-Burraco and Boeckx (2014) call “comparative
biolinguistics”), a field aimed to be well embedded within the
interdisciplinary explorations of the life sciences. Certain linguists
have also taken note of such concerns; Bolender et al. (2008, p.
132) recommend that, “So far as possible, seek explanations of
uniquely human concepts in terms of syntactic computations.”We
can adapt thismaxim to Computational Ethology and propose the
Carving Guideline:
(16) Carving Guideline:
Seek explanations of non-human conceptual systems in
terms of the application of operations from the cognome.
Given that cyclic transfer of labeled structures to the CI
interface may be unique to humans, the silence of many
ethologists when it comes to issues of semantics (and not just
meaningless symbol sequences processed by the SM interface)
should be of great concern. The songs of birds (Berwick et al.,
2011; Slater, 2012) and cetaceans (Cholewiak et al., 2013,
see Figure 4) are distinct from other forms of non-human
externalization in displaying hierarchical structures. While there
is no evidence of compositional semantics or recursion, whale
song has been shown to be “built up from themes, consisting
of phrases, consisting of units, in turn built up from subunits.
Hence, whale song might rightly be characterized as hierarchical”
(Zuidema, 2013b, p. 180).
Suzuki et al. (2006) demonstrated the existence of a
strong structural constraint in humpback whale (Megaptera
novaeangliae) songs which cannot be represented in Markovian
terms. But, as with birdsong, these combinatorial abilities are
independent of conceptual structures. Hierarchy, though limited,
is present in the social cognition of spotted hyenas (Holekamp
et al., 2007). The songs of starlings, nightingales and Bengalese
finches contain elements which may be followed by numerous
others, and the structure of the song is determined by probabilistic
rules between a finite number of states. Indeed the “structural
flexibility” of birdsong may “suggest that the computations
necessary for sequencing the song elements are independent
of the sensorimotor representations over which they operate”
(Langus et al., 2013, p. 232).
Taking stock, with labeling being unique to humans the
cognome of a Bengalese finch would perhaps be (minimally) as
follows:
(17) /TAENIOPYGIAGUTTATA = {k, X }
This cognome can additionally be attributed to Campbell’s
monkeys, based on what we saw in Section “Approaching
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FIGURE 4 | Spectrographic model of humpback whale song recorded at
Isla Socorro, Mexico, on 27 March 2006 (from Cholewiak et al., 2013, p.
E318). Note that multiple sub-phrases group into a phrase, which can vary in
their temporal and spectral characteristics, leading to the suggestion that
“humpback phrases and bird songs are analogous” (E324; compare with
Figure 1). (A) One phrase composed of two sub-phrases. (B) Multiple phrase
types exhibited throughout 155s of song sequence. Phrases are defined
through vertical lines.
Computational Ethology: The Evidence” based on the evidence
reviewed. The finch would also employ Transfer operations,
but the above appear to be the bare necessities, with the
finch’s stock of vocalization types permitting numerous tokens
of these vocalizations to be repeatedly externalized, hence some
form of Copy operation would conceivably be involved. Animal
signals do not display anything related to agreement relations
or grammatical types, and given the discontinuities between
human syntax and such signals it becomes untenable to support
either a protolanguage hypothesis or what I will call a Strong
Continuity Hypothesis, invoking gestures, music or theory of mind
as language precursors.
(18) Strong Continuity Hypothesis: There are no novel operations
employed by /H, and it is only certain human-specific
physiological and behavioral traits (e.g., bipedalism, long
infant dependency), along with a specific combination of
cognitive faculties found in other species (e.g., theory of
mind, imitation) which are the distinguishing features of
humans.
The related claim that language evolved from a single precursor
has been criticized from a number of fronts (see Hauser et al.,
2014). Why imitation and self-awareness are relevant to the
inheritance of 0-features is never made clear by proponents of
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strong continuity (e.g., Gibson, 2013, p. 201–211). Diverging from
this line of inquiry, Hinzen and Sheehan (2013, p. 73) conclude
that many animals perform tasks that “require the computations
of values for variables in such a way that a homomorphism
exists between the internal computations and the perceived
structure of external reality.” Humans managed to “obtain
internal address systems (roots) for their representations of
environmental features, which can be used to symbolically refer
to the world,” a drastic representational change which supports a
Weak Continuity Hypothesis:
(19) Weak Continuity Hypothesis:
Novelty of computational capacity, along with certain
physiological and behavioral traits, are the distinguishing
features of humans, and only limited cases of continuity
exist between the mental representations generated by /H
and non-human CI systems due to the lack of cyclically
transferred labeled structures in the latter.
This position can be defended by referring back to the above
discussion concerning the cyclic transfer of labeled structures
to both interfaces, which appears to be unique to humans. The
Weak Continuity Hypothesis, and the concerns of Computational
Ethology more generally, become even more apparent when
we note the rapid shift in priorities in much of contemporary
phonological theory, which has firstly moved from asking “Do
songbirds have recursion?” to “Do songbirds have labels?,” and
secondly has begun to inquire into whether human phonology
employs labels (VanOostendorp, 2013). Discussing this final topic
will take us too far afield, but we can at least conclude that labeling
appears to have re-formattedmental life by providingwhat Boeckx
(2010, p. 128) would call a “universal currency” carrying out
cross-modular transactions between the “specific vocabulary”
(Chierchia, 2010, p. 166) of “core knowledge systems” such as
OBJECT MECHANICS and NATURAL GEOMETRY (Kinzler
and Spelke, 2007; Carey, 2009). Lexicalisation “puts all concepts
on a par, making them all accessible in the workspace” (Boeckx,
2012, p. 49), “going beyond modular boundaries” (Boeckx and
Benitez-Burraco, 2014, p. 4), becoming the LPCs of pLEX. As
Ursini (2011, p. 215) phrases it, “language represents a “neutral”
logical space, a model of knowledge representation in which
different concepts can be freely combined.”
I would like to suggest that Computational Ethology,
by exploring the capacities of various cognomes across the
ethological spectrum, has the potential to act as a powerful
tool for comparative biolinguistics, with the major obstacles
currently being methodological and theoretical/computational.
For instance, in addition to the problems raised above concerning
definitions of primitive operations, there is also the likelihood
that formal language hierarchies are inadequate in evaluating a
substantial range of cognitive capacities (see the scattered range
of natural language patterns in Figure 2), no matter how precisely
they map onto particular embedding and nesting procedures.
Computational Ethology should begin to move away from formal
language hierarchies, useful though they may have been, toward
the kind of finer-grained analysis which theoretical linguistics
can deliver. The Chomsky Hierarchy is ultimately too generic
and “weak,” since various cognitive methods can yield a single
MCS structure, not just the human labeling algorithm. Different
aspects of phonology and syntax also fall into different subregions
of the hierarchy, making claims about artificial grammar learning
yielding insights intomonolithic concepts like “syntax” inherently
misleading.
Approaching the Labeling Hypothesis
Having presented the LabelingHypothesis, alongwith the broader
Weak Continuity Hypothesis, concerns immediately arise about
how to test the predictions of a label-only theory of language
evolution. Perhaps the most direct evidence in support of the
Labeling Hypothesis would arrive in the form of data revealing
either (i) a lack of cyclicity not just to the SM interface, but also
the CI interface, or (ii) a lack of cognitive effects arising from
the form of trivial tail recursion found in, for instance, birdsong.
For instance, returning to the discussion of wild mountain
gorillas, testing whether nettle preparation involves hierarchical
planning or a looped routine requires isolating the (proposed)
hierarchical procedure itself, abstracting away from the initial
memorized routines of finding a nettle patch. If the procedure
involved in stripping stems and tearing off petioles is indeed
hierarchical, then the gorillas would also be able to perform an
unrelated task with the same number of steps and, crucially, the
same form of hierarchy at a different point in the procedure
(perhaps at the second, and not third, step). This would control
for the effects of short term memory capacity, and if the new
task is unrelated both to nettle preparation and the gorilla’s
lifestyle then performing it successfully, given the inclusion of a
hierarchical procedure, would suggest that the gorillas had not
memorized a looped routine but are in fact utilizing their set-
forming and chunking capacities in novel circumstances. Further
behavioral investigations could test this on other subspecies of
gorilla, considering the limitations of conducting experiments
on the endangered mountain gorillas (see also Dawkins, 1976
for discussion of the efficiency of hierarchical organizations of
common subroutines).
Effective ways of testing the Labeling Hypothesis could
also come from eliminating many of the current obstacles
found in ethological experiments. For instance, numerous
studies of birdsong include redundant variation in syllable
elements (e.g., Gentner et al., 2006), forcing the two unrelated
tasks of syllable categorisation and sequence learning to
conflict. Ignoring this introduces confounds and leads to
premature conclusions about both the counting and sequencing
capacities of birds. Decomposing tasks is equally as important
as decomposing the computational operations animals are
claimed to perform. In domains outside of linguistics, however,
a focus on computational issues is sorely lacking. Attending to
these concerns could potentially refine discussions of particular
ethological and psychological concepts. For instance, it has
been noted (Terrace, 2002, p. 25) that an operational definition
of chunking is largely absent from a great deal of research.
Embedding such opaque constructs within a framework of
syntactic combinatorics may result in the limits and range
of such capacities being exposed; much like how decades of
computational inquiry into grammatical phenomena led to an
understanding of certain generic properties of language such
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FIGURE 5 | One-dimensional and multi-dimensional approaches to the
mind/brain contrasted (from Boeckx and Theofanopoulou, 2014, p.
406).
as minimal search principles (Narita, 2014; Chomsky, 2015a;
Larson, 2015).
The perspective of Computational Ethology advocated
presently also ought to be framed in the context of a broader
investigation linking the cognome to the dynome [the study
of brain dynamics and oscillations (Kopell et al., 2014)], the
connectome [the set of neural connections in a given nervous
system (Sporns et al., 2005)], and ultimately the genome, as
advocated in Boeckx and Theofanopoulou (2014; see Figure 5).
The priorities of each of these disciplines needs to be considered
by the computational ethologist and the linguist working one
way or another within the Decompositionalist Project (Murphy,
2015c, see also Embick and Poeppel, 2015).
Considering briefly the genome, is has been proposed that
1,241 primate-specific genes exist (Zhang et al., 2011), 280 of
which are human-specific. 54% of these human-specific genes
are upregulated in a brain area implicated in higher cognition,
the prefrontal cortex. These new genes are “much more likely
to be involved in gene regulation” (Diller and Cann, 2013, p.
256). Consequently, it is not unlikely that the mutation of some
regulatory gene reorganized the neuronal populations in the
neocortex and the computational properties concomitant with it,
partly contributing in the systempursued here to the emergence of
x, a genuine evolutionary novelty. This position seems reasonable
given recent evidence that the complex syntax of Bengalese finch
songs developed from simple neurological changes (Katahira
et al., 2013). Although given the level of regulatory complexity
identified by Chakravarti (2011), it is more likely that x emerged
after the mutation of multiple regulatory genes acting in concert,
and not a singular mutational event as often claimed by
minimalists (e.g., Chomsky, 2010): “Genes and their products
almost never act alone, but in networks with other genes and
proteins and in [the] context of the environment” (Chakravarti,
2011, p. 15). Of relevance here is the finding that human evolution
has slowed down, often called the “hominoid slowdown”: “[R]ates
of occurrence of de novo mutations decreased as enhanced
DNA repair mechanisms and larger generation times evolved”
(Goodman, 1985, p. 10). Hominoids appear to have reached
a certain mesa of complexity, with only slight tuning yielding
novel benefits. In summary, a slight epigenetic change, call it the
FIGURE 6 | Transition diagram of a domesticated Bengalese finch
song (upper) and a wild white-rumped munia song (lower). “S” indicates
the start of a song, “E” indicates the end (from Okanoya, 2012, p. 48).
“Small Bang,” could have produced an alteration in the human
computational system yielding x.
A separate question now arises concerning when the Small
Bang took place. Putting aside precise dates, and assuming that
anatomically modern humans emerged around 150–200 kya, it
appears that complex forms of symbolic representation did not
begin until 60–100 kya (Hurford, 2011). This is also the time
period correlating with new migration patterns (Mellars, 2006),
leading to the possibility that properties of the environment acted
as release factors for the labeling capacity, as they also appear
to do for the singing capacities of genetically identical finches
subject to distinct environmental upbringings (Okanoya, 2012,
see Figure 6). Encountering new forms of social organization and
environments may have served to prompt the basic combinatorics
ofmammalian cognition and encourage novel forms of (ultimately
cyclic) conceptual combination. Bolender (2007) has suggested
along these lines that an increased human population, leading to
a greater complexity of inter-group communication, acted as a
trigger for the use of word movement, hitherto dormant. If this
is correct, then investigating syntactic phenomena from a purely
computational perspective, not considering the influence of the
development and emergence of the phenotype, would be missing
a crucial part of any explanatory account.
I would also like to raise a final prospect for Computational
Ethology in relation to the dynome. Given that the hierarchy
of brain oscillations appears to have remained extraordinarily
preserved during mammalian evolution (Buzsáki et al., 2013),
the construction of a new substitute for the flawed Chomsky
Hierarchy, which makes brain rhythms and computational
operations like set-formation and labeling commensurable, is an
urgent challenge. Brain rhythms can also enhance understanding
of information chunking (Giraud and Poeppel, 2012), and could
therefore act as a bridge between neurobiology, ethology and the
algorithmic and computational levels of syntactic theory. The
research of what we could call “Rhythmic Syntax” could lead to
an expansion of the concerns of ethologists and the priorities
of linguists, many of whom pay lip-service to how language
can act as a window into the brain but rarely step outside the
confines of debates about, for instance, ellipsis and binding theory.
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Any account of syntactic phenomena will inevitably be deficient
if it fails to consider the release factors of mental capacities
and the brain rhythms which form and constrain computation.
Research on this front may well prove stimulating and fruitful
(McCormick et al., 2015; Murphy, 2015a). In short, Rhythmic
Syntax will likely allow us to “see” labeling effects more clearly
than the forms of behavioral and neuroimaging data ethologists
and neurolinguists are used to. Through placing the brain at
the centre of inquiry, both Computational Ethology and the
Decompositionalist Project are in turn aligned closer to the
comparative biolinguistics advocated by Benítez-Burraco and
Boeckx (2014) than they are to generative grammar and its recent
(though illuminating) approaches to language as a system of
minimal computation. These debates should consequently not be
confined to minimalist quarters.
Conclusion
The LabelingHypothesis proposed here, in concert with theWeak
Continuity Hypothesis, lead to new directions for ethological and
syntactic inquiry into the computational capacities of humans
and non-humans. The field of Computational Ethology which
proposes to test these hypotheses has yet to be undertaken to
any serious degree, with only a small number of researchers
investigating the cognomes of the great apes and a small number of
avian and other species. But if the task of the linguist is to explore
the computational properties of mental structures in an effort
for these principles to be employed as the goals of neurobiology,
then it is hard to see how these programs could fail to be
worthwhile. It is additionally my hope that this contribution will
lead to the strengthening of the computational rigor of ethological
inquiry, and to further interdisciplinary research into the nature
of the Small Bang. GPS monitoring, bioacoustic analysis and
telemetric recordings can enhance observation, but substantial
theoretical advances will only arrive if the computational studies
of syntacticians are acknowledged by a wider audience.
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